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The Perception of Electorate in Kosovo on Structure of the Report Between Ideology and Political Parties

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Abstract

This paper attempts to explain the perception of Kosovo's electorate about the relationship of political parties in Kosovo with ideology. For the purpose of empirical testing of the Ideology report with political parties in Kosovo as part of the study, it was judged to undertake a survey to investigate how the Kosovo electorate perceived the policy report with ideology. On primary resources, the data provided by the survey conducted with 310 respondents in Kosovo were used. Through this survey we will present the results of the interpretation of the data provided by the frequency tables and the cross tablets. In this presentation, generally, data from one-variable and two-variable cross-tab data and statistical values of Cramer's V compilation values and Approx. Sig. to the Symmetric Measures table. After the data presentations, the interpretation of these values will be made with their possible significant statistical associations and the empirical test report on the implications under consideration.

1. Introduction

Earlier studies attempted to codify the ideological profiles of political parties in Kosovo, but it has been noted that their categorization into a category was impossible. Earlier studies profiled political parties as the head of the stated. This does not invalidate high dictation profiling because Political Parties in Kosovo parties are organizations to the hierarchy where decisions are taken by a small group of officials. Even countries with a long tradition in democracy find it difficult to categorize political parties into one or other ideology, not to talk a war-torn society that is still trying to combine its citizenship.

Research question: How is the relationship between ideology and political party structured in Kosovo structured?

In response to this research question is given the basic assumption as follows.

Basic assumption: There is presently a judgment by the Kosovo electorate of an ideological grouping of the political programs and political activity of the Parties in the Republic of Kosovo.

In this research, we identified it as advantageous to develop early reviews by showing a study of the major political parties in Kosovo. Mutual promulgation of points of view is a further reasonable explanation of where a political party platforms and what tendency of polling can be supposed to have their members in the Parliament. This

absence of ideological identity can simply be pointed out by the fact that the Political Parties in Kosovo were established during the democracy struggles. The parties were organized by groups that were assembled during the war or protection, and which integrated geography, occupation, or household commitments. Accordingly, we can express that the parties gather around themselves a corresponding contribution of radical, liberal or nationalist parties because these people were not at all a proof for their original approximation. Most of the parties were established before the state had a constitutional government and still before particular socio-industrial groups appearing to cooperate to fight for a strongly-established activity in election boxes or in the Parliament (Muir, 1997).

Evolutionary development towards the profiling of political parties was further delayed because Kosovars did not rule the country mostly of the post-war period. For a long time, Kosovo was administered by the international community, which deprived the political elite of the country's government - and this non-participation in government spared local elected politicians from the need to position themselves on specific political issues. Since Kosovo is not a member of the UN, its foreign policy can allow itself not to take any stand on issues of international importance.

2. Methodology

For the purpose of factual analysis of the Ideology report with Political Parties in Kosovo as pulling out of the research, it was considered to offer a survey to study how the Kosovo electorate regarded the policy report with ideology. On essential sources, the factors presented by the survey showed with 310 respondents in Kosovo were needed.

A survey serves to collect material that serves to empirically demonstrate an assumption explanation of use or underlying premise, there was a demand to explain such an explanation. In the process under review, the issue was confusion in formulating the program statement with ideology. Here are two questions that can be suggested:

How is the relationship between ideology and political parties organized in Kosovo? and,

What is the organization of politics with ideology in Kosovo society?

Two results can be produced for these research questions, one for each. One in the set up of an assumption, which proves to point out the origins of such confusion. The second is the work of a key theory that precisely defines the system in question. Although uncertainty in the analysis may be limited and not fundamental, it was agreed to use in both areas: a) to point out this ambiguity; b) providing a coherent point of Kosovo's voter's consciousness of establishing the relationship between politics and ideology. Further, this research can be deeply analyzed by considering the changes in this report from the point of view of explaining its causes in the set up of an assumption.

From this survey, besides the factors directed at empirical

analysis of the main assumption, statistics have also collected that add to the analytical concept which considers the causes that produce ideology invisible to political parties in Kosovo.

The survey presented not give appropriate questions about ideological tendencies but brought forward 12 (twelve) different queries on a variety of releases. Each answer corresponds to a positioning process, which thus enters in a diagram.

To ensure that the survey can provide a good means for this task, we early analyze the main political ideologies around the world, as we will conduct a thorough analysis of the views expressed by the Political Parties in Kosovo.

Due to the compound structure of the phenomenon, any new aspect, inaccessible to keep comprehensive study, but at least tried at handing over an analytical input to a small increase in the knowledge of the case and the circumstances that have shaped ambiguity in finding the scale of political parties to ideology in Kosovo. While empirical, provide test statistics collected from a survey based on the perception that Kosovo's electorate has on planning and releasing political parties in Kosovo with ideology.

Since such a hypothesis is set up in the form of a judgment compelling or knowledge, an analysis is suggested if...., then...

So it goes on the one and only means to empirically implicitly prove it through empirical analysis of the Impacts inferred from it. So from this assumption reasonably have been developed Impacts of the of tentative judgment, which gives the setting empirical test. Depending on the outcome of this analysis, it will be found whether or not the underlying assumption is common, which will conclude (but not reasonably!) The empirical analysis of the assumption in the query.

Under these conditions, the subsequent Impacts are deducted:

Indicator 1: If political party programs do not conform to the requirements that are accustomed by their ideological direction, thus the part of their ideologically-voted voter tends to vote less.

Indicator 2: If Political Parties choose on their elective programs steps that run respond to the traditional ideological wing politics they believe to belong to, they imperil losing support from their voter.

Indicator 3: If Political party programs do not match their activities in government, thus the pulling out of their ideologically-determined voter tends to vote less.

Of this rather general Impact, purer and better direct Impacts for the empirical analysis of the following can be deducted:

Indicator 3.1: If the PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo) program appears not correspond with its actions in government then the pulling out of their ideologically-determined electorate tends to vote less.

Indicator 3.2: If the LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo) program appears not correspond with its actions in government then the pulling out of their ideologically-determined electorate tends to vote less

Indicator 3.3: If the VV (Self-Determination Movement)

program appears not correspond with its actions in government then the pulling out of their ideologically-determined electorate tends to vote less

Impact of Indicators 1: Indicators of right and left policy programs. Report of the programs of PDK, LDK and VV with these indicators. The voter's point of view concerning the consent of the programs with the indicators in question and the elective cost that predicts in case of discrepancy between them (Survey data of the result of the pulls that speak of ideological voting behavior).

Impact of Indicators 2: Respondents' judgment referring to the perception of Political Parties voter of the distinctions between the program and the activities of the government (Survey- The electorate's opinion, 2017).

Impact of Indicators 2.1: Respondents' judgment referring to the perception of PDK voter of the distinctions between the program and the activities of the government (Survey data of knowing the political program of PDK, 2017).

Impact of Indicators 2.2: Respondents' Opinions Concerning Perceptions by LDK Electorate of Differences between Program and LDK Actions in Governance (Survey data of knowing the political program of LDK, 2017).

Impact of Indicators 2.3: Respondents' judgment referring to the perception of VV voter of the distinctions between the program and the activities of the government (Survey data of knowing the political programs of VV, 2017).

From this survey, in addition to data aimed at empirical analysis of the main hypothesis, are taken up factors that support the theoretical concept which consider the elements that cause the ideology invisible to political parties in Kosovo.

Based on the indicators, the question groups were set up to hand over the relevant material for the empirical analysis of each implication.

Sample Determination: Since Kosovo becomes 1 (one) electoral area, the pattern is worked out by the indiscriminate

sample method. More exactly, respondents from various municipalities of Kosovo have been singled out. In these conditions, a pattern survey was organized (based on age groups and gender), with the survey used included detailed queries referred to parties, their programs, the political wing of parties and respondents. The survey period lasted 10 days, on which occasion 310 respondents from 5 various age groups (18-25 years, 26-35 years old, 36-45 years old, 46-55 years and over 55 years) were interviewed; of whom 47% were women and 53% males.

After the finalization of the reception of the respondents, the data were retrieved and then placed in a database. The data was put to the SPSS.20.0 program. After this, accurate statistical transform was completed, consisting of number tables, many charts and crossed tables designed to turn up the probable statistical associations of the worked out to empirically verify before assigned implications. You will meet them as attachments at the end of the work.

3. Findings

Through this survey we will hand out the results of reading the statistics presented by the number tables and the cross tablets. In this presentation data from one-variable and two-variable cross-tab data and statistical values of Cramer's V compilation values and Approx. Sig. to the Symmetric Measures table. After the data shows, understanding these values will be made with their potential symbolic statistical associations and the empirical test account for on the implications under discussion.

1. To find out the results of the surveys that speak of ideological or practical voting behaviour, we are making the table statistics that provides the answer to the query: "In general, will you say people have specific political views? We have the following results:

Table 1. Political Convictions. (Survey data of the result of the pulls that speak of ideological voting behavior, 2017).

In general, will you say people have specific political views?					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes, completely	34	11,0	11,0	11,0
	Yes, to a great extent	133	42,9	42,9	53,9
	Yes, somehow	98	31,6	31,6	85,5
	More, no	27	8,7	8,7	94,2
	Not at all	11	3,5	3,5	97,7
	I do not know	7	2,3	2,3	100,0
	Total	310	100,0	100,0	

From respondents' replies, we find out that people have specific political convictions at 85.5 percent versus 14.5% who oppose it. So the proportion of them is 5.9: 1 in support of assertions. Conforming to this it can be estimated that the Kosovo voter can be assumed in its larger part as a political one.

2. With the query "Do you know the political party programs in our country?", We have the following data:

Table 2. The political party programs in Kosovo. (Survey data of knowing the political programs, 2017).

With the query "Do you know the political party programs in our country?"					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes, for all parties	23	7,4	7,4	7,4
	Yes, for most of them	53	17,1	17,1	24,5
	Yes, for some of them	128	41,3	41,3	65,8
	Yes, just for a party	6	1,9	1,9	67,7
	No, for no party	90	29,0	29,0	96,8

With the query "Do you know the political party programs in our country?"				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
I do not know	10	3,2	3,2	100,0
Total	310	100,0	100,0	

From these shreds of evidence, it can be identified that approximately 68% of respondents declare that they have seen the programs of at least one political party (from one party to all parties) versus roughly 33% who claim they know none political party program. So the proportion of them is 2.1:

1 for the favour of the recognition of political party programs.

3. When asked "Do you think people, in general, know how to distinguish whether a party's program belongs to the political wing it claims to belong to?", We have the following information:

Table 2. Political wings. (Survey data of knowing the ideology of a political party, 2017).

Do you think people, in general, know how to distinguish whether a party's program belongs to the political wing it claims to belong to?				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes, completely	18	5,8	5,8
	Yes, to a great extent	40	12,9	18,7
	Yes, somehow	114	36,8	55,5
	More, no	108	34,8	90,3
	Not at all	20	6,5	96,8
	I do not know	10	3,2	100,0
	Total	310	100,0	

From this evidence, it can be understood that 55.5% of people, in general, can understand whether a political party program belongs to the wing it claims to belong to versus 44.5% who oppose it. So the scale between them is 1.1: 1 value clearly in approve of recognizing the argument.

4. To the question that. "Do you think that the general public does not judge that their party should be punished simply because its program does not fully or to a large extent conform to the ideological orientation it claims to belong to?" these data:

Table 3. The behavior of pragmatic voters. (Survey data of knowing the ideological orientation of political parties, 2017).

"Do you think that the general public does not judge that their party should be punished simply because its program does not fully or to a large extent conform to the ideological orientation it claims to belong to?"				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes, completely	122	39,4	39,4
	Yes, to a great extent	50	16,1	55,5
	Yes, somehow	56	18,1	73,5
	More, no	36	11,6	85,2
	Not at all	10	3,2	88,4
	I do not now	16	5,2	93,5
	No answer	20	6,5	100,0
	Total	310	100,0	

From this evidence, 73.6% declare to our query, related to 26.4% who express negative deal with to this query. So the ratio between them is 2.7: 1 to support positive feedbacks. From this data, one can make the analysis we have an acceptance of an act of pragmatic voters at the stage of

respondents. This report is a negative result of empirical testing of Indicator 1.

5. The question: "As long as you know, people generally consider PDK a party that belongs to an ideological wing?" We have these data:

Table 4. PDK party. (Survey data of knowing the political program of PDK,, 2017).

As long as you know, people generally consider PDK a party that belongs to an ideological wing?				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	In the far left	21	6,8	6,8
	In the left wing	49	15,8	22,6
	In the center of the left	17	5,5	28,1
	In the center right	10	3,2	31,3
	On the right wing	20	6,5	37,7
	In the far right	14	4,5	42,3
	In no wing	29	9,4	51,6
	Other	8	2,6	54,2
	I do not know	90	29,0	83,2
	No answer	12	3,9	87,1
	Next: nowhere	15	4,8	91,9
	Next: I do not clearly see	25	8,1	100,0
	Total	310	100,0	

From these data, people consider PDK as a left-wing party with 28.1% versus 14.2% as important as a right-wing party (ratio 1.98: 1) and 14.2% who do not list PDK in no wing. However, about 8% of respondents do not figure out the ideological direction of this party. So from these data, it can

be said adequately is a need of clarity about the ideological identity of this party.

6. The question: "As far as you know, in general, people consider LDK as a party belonging to an ideological wing" we have the following data:

Table 5. LDK party. (Survey data of knowing the political program of LDK, 2017).

As far as you know, in general, people consider LDK as a party belonging to an ideological wing					
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	
Valid	In the far left	6	1,9	1,9	1,9
	In the left wing	4	1,3	1,3	3,2
	In the center of the left	20	6,5	6,5	9,7
	In the center right	106	34,2	34,2	43,9
	On the right wing	66	21,3	21,3	65,2
	In the far right	13	4,2	4,2	69,4
	In no wing	21	6,8	6,8	76,1
	Other	2	,6	,6	76,8
	I do not know	57	18,4	18,4	95,2
	No answer	5	1,6	1,6	96,8
	Next: nowhere	10	3,2	3,2	100,0
	Total	310	100,0	100,0	

9.7% who consider it as a left-wing party versus 59.7% (ratio 1: 6.15) claim LDK is positioned as a right-wing party and 8.4% do not class it on either side. So, about 15% do not recognize the LDK as a right-wing party. This proves that

there is confusion in the ideological status of this party.

7. The question: "As far as you know, in general, people consider VV as a party belonging to an ideological wing", we have the following data:

Table 6. VV party. (Survey data of knowing the political programs of VV, 2017).

As far as you know, in general, people consider VV as a party belonging to an ideological wing					
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	
Valid	In the far left	78	25,2	25,2	25,2
	In the left wing	42	27,5	27,5	38,7
	In the center of the left	13	14,2	14,2	42,9
	In the center right	6	1,9	1,9	44,8
	On the right wing	5	1,6	1,6	46,5
	In the far right	11	3,5	3,5	50,0
	In no wing	25	8,1	8,1	58,1
	Other	5	1,6	1,6	59,7
	I do not know	113	6,5	6,5	96,1
	No answer	1	5,3	5,3	96,5
	Next: nowhere	11	4,1	4,1	100,0
	Total	310	100,0	100,0	

66.9% of respondents identify the VV as a left-wing party versus 7% (proportion 9.5: 1) consider them as a right-wing party, and 13.4% declare that it does not belong to any ideological wing. So, around 20.4% do not perceive the VV as a left-wing party. This indicates that although there is a

great percentage of them looked at as the Left Party, there is still confusion in the ideological status of this party.

8. The question: "Do you consider PDK's activities in power differ the programs declared during election campaigns?"

Table 7. PDK's activities in the government. (Survey data of knowing the PDK's political program, 2017).

Do you consider PDK's activities in power differ the programs declared during election campaigns					
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	
Valid	Yes	272	87,7	87,7	87,7
	No	38	12,3	12,3	100,0
	Total	310	100,0	100,0	

87.7% of respondents expect there are discrepancy s between the PDK's activities and the ideological orientation it claims to belong to 12.3% of those who oppose it. The proportion between them is 7.1: 1 in support of affirmation.

9. The question: Do you consider PDK's activities in power differ the programs announced during election campaigns? If

YES, in such instances, do you consider in case of discrepancy between PDK's activities in governing and ideological direction it takes to belong to, the voter will proceed by not voting for this party.

Table 8. PDK's activities during election. (Survey data of knowing the PDK's action in the government contradict the program declared during election campaigns, 2017).

Do you consider PDK's activities in power differ the programs announced during election campaigns? If YES, in such instances, do you consider in case of discrepancy between PDK's activities in governing and ideological direction it takes to belong to, the voter will proceed by not voting for this party.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes, completely	13	4,2	4,8	20,7
	Yes, to a great extent	19	6,2	7,0	76,8
	Yes, somehow	54	17,4	35,3	91,0
	More, no	96	31,0	20,6	95,2
	Not at all	56	18,0	19,8	96,1
	I do not know	20	6,5	7,4	98,7
	No answer	14	4,5	5,1	100,0
	Total	272	87,7	100,0	
	Missing system	38	12,3		
Total		100			

10. Do you consider LDK's activities in power differ the programs declared during the election campaigns??

Table 9. LDK's activities during the election campaigns. (Survey data of knowing the LDK's political program, 2017).

Do you consider LDK's activities in power differ the programs declared during the election campaigns??					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	220	71,0	71,0	71,0
	No	90	29,0	29,0	100,00
	Total	310	100,0	100,0	

71.0% of respondents consider there is a discrepancy between LDK actions in governance with programs declared during ballot campaigns, compared to 29.0% of those who oppose it. The proportion between them is 7.1: 1 to support affirmation.

11. The question: "Do you consider LDK's activities in

power differ the programs declared during the ballot campaigns? If YES, in such situations, do you consider in case of discrepancy between the LDK's activities in the governing and ideological orientation it claims to belong to, the voter will react by not voting for this party.

Table 10. LDK's activities in the governing and ideological orientation. (Survey data of knowing the LDK's action in the government contradict the program declared during election campaigns, 2017).

Do you consider LDK's activities in power differ the programs declared during the ballot campaigns? If YES, in such situations, do you consider in case of discrepancy between the LDK's activities in the governing and ideological orientation it claims to belong to, the voter will react by not voting for this party					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes, completely	23	7,4	10,4	95,2
	Yes, to a great extent	58	18,7	26,4	76,8
	Yes, somehow	44	14,2	20,0	91,0
	More, no	80	25,8	36,4	20,7
	Not at all	3	1,0	1,4	96,1
	I do not know	8	2,6	3,6	98,7
	No answer	4	1,3	1,8	100,0
	Total	220	71	100,0	
Missing system	90	29,0			
Total		310	100		

56.8% of respondents think that the actions of the ruling LDK do not match the programs announced during the election campaigns, think that the electorate will react with no vote to this party in the next election. Meanwhile, 37.8% who claim that there are discrepancies between the government's actions and the program stated in the electoral campaign and think that the electorate will react by not voting for this in the next election.

So the ratio between them is 1.5: 1 for the benefit of the non-voting option.

This report shows a positive result of the empirical testing of the Indicator 3.2

12. The question: Do you think there is a discrepancy between VV's program and the ideological wing it claims to belong to? If YES, in such cases, do you think in case of discrepancy between the VV program and the ideological

wing that does not claim it belongs, the electorate will react with no vote to that party? We have these data:

Table 11. *VV's activities and ideological orientation. (Survey data of knowing the VV's program and ideological wing, 2017).*

In your opinion do you generally think that there is a discrepancy between VV's program and the ideological wing that it claims to belong to? If YES, in such cases, do you think that in case of discrepancy between the VV program and the ideological wing that does not claim it belongs, the electorate will react with no vote to that party					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes, completely	49	15,8	31,4	31,4
	Yes, to a great extent	22	7,1	14,1	45,5
	Yes, somehow	29	9,4	18,6	64,1
	More, no	34	11,0	21,8	85,9
	Not at all	11	3,5	7,1	92,9
	I do not know	11	3,5	7,1	100,0
Missing	Total	156	50,3	100,0	
	System	154	49,7		
Total		310	100,0		

From the table we understand that 64.1% of the respondents who claim to have discrepancies between the VV program and the ideological wing that it claims to belong to the electorate will react by not voting for this party in the next election. While 7.1% of respondents claiming there are discrepancies between the VV program and the ideological wing that it claims to belong to, do not think the electorate will react by not voting this party in the next election. The ratio between them is 9.0: 1 against the non-voting option. So even in this case we have a negative result of empirical testing.

4. Analysis of Results

Considering the above results we have examined in specific the results of the empirical analysis of those means related to the empirical test of the basic hypothesis.

On Indicator 1 we have empirical test results emerging from the crossing tables of the triads of variables linked to PDK and LDK. From the trio crosses related to PDK emerges that we have 2 negative tests.

But from the crossed-down triangles that are related to LDK it turns out that we have 2 positive tests.

By analyzing the statistic tables on the returns to the question "Can people consider that a party should be penalized simply because its program not or to a considerable extent conform to the ideological wing what does it pretend to belong?" We have a negative result of empirical testing of Indicator 1.

Respondents support the implication 1 for the PDK and LDK electorate, and reject it for the electorate of VV. But we also have a negative result of the empirical testing of the implication 1. So the proportion between them is 2:1 in favour of the negative result of the empirical test of the Indicator 1

As far as the VV party from the table is regarded, 64.1% of the respondents claiming there are differences between the VV's program and the ideological wing it claims to belong, the voter will react to not vote for this party in the next election. While 7.1% of respondents claiming there are discrepancies between the VV program and the ideological wing it claims to belong to, do not think the electorate will

react by not voting this party in the next election. The ratio between them is 9.0: 1 against the non-voting option. So even in this case we have a negative result of empirical test.

5. Conclusions

The limitation of this paper is that it consists of particularly the three main political parties in Kosovo. These results in outcomes can not be so representative in other cases that they can not be generalized.

In this paper, we concentrated mainly on the vagueness of structuring political party reports with political ideology. The study is dealt with in two stages: the initial is that the uncertainty of structuring political parties with ideology is noticed in their electoral programs and the second is political discourse.

We can conclude that there is confusion in setting up the political party's report with ideologies. Generally, political parties determine programs that are not in line with the ideological political matrixes they declare they belong to. The same ambiguity situation is further indicated in the relationship between political activity and the demands that derive from the political wing they claim to belong.

Comparing the report of ideology with political parties in the Republic of Kosovo, we note that the uncertainties in structuring the report in question are conditioned by social, economic and political factors such as: Kosovo status settlement (by 2008), dynamics of structuring groups the role of internationals in Kosovo, the inadequate role of NGOs in organizing and mobilizing citizens to protect the partial interests of some social groups, the lack of ideological structured elites and the globalization effects.

This paper is an aid to the definition of this report between Political Parties in Kosovo and Ideology and the building of a democratic society in Kosovo. In supplement to its academic value, this identification and categorization is intended to assist political parties in assessing the degree of coherence for the entire public policy issues among senior leaders.

Most parties have not even moved from normative statements, which show the desire of leadership in what direction it intends to develop the party. The profile they ask for does not coincide with the position they have on different

issues, nor with the history of their voting in the Assembly. Worse still, the party's senior leadership is not a map of political party orientation to turn the ideological denomination into concrete guidance on how to vote and position lower-level officials and sympathizers. Whether the party will reach the destination designated by its governing bodies depends on the opinions of a wider group of leaders. For this, it was essential to analyze the main political party in Kosovo such as Democratic Party of Kosovo - DCP and Democratic League of Kosovo - LDK, which has held the main burden of building the state of Kosovo.

This paper also analyzes the political discourses of a wider circle of influential party officials and activists. The consistency of political parties' positions is of fundamental importance in the transition, as the parties transform themselves from being the means to realize the interests of certain groups in being a representative of a stable base of voters with specific common interests.

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